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In the beginning everyone agreed that the business of the mind was using propositional logic on 
internal representations.  Then Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) resurrected connectionism, 
the idea that simple neuron-like units were a viable cognitive architecture.  Enthusiasm for 
the new paradigm led to claims that the view of mind as a propositional-logic machine was 
outmoded.  Jerry Fodor -- perhaps understandably so, having written a book entitled The 
Language of Thought -- was perturbed by the implication that such a language was a chimera 
that could be replaced by a sufficiently complex neural network.
 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988; hereafter F&P) therefore challenged the connectionists to show 
how their approach could possibly produce a systematic intelligence.  The challenge was 
largely evaded rather than answered, in that no 1980s-connectionist architectures achieved 
systematicity.  Subsequently, a “post-connectionist” movement emerged, combining enactivism, 
behaviour-based AI, embodied and distributed cognition, dynamical systems theory, etc.  
These ideas share anti-dualist and anti-representational themes (see Thompson 2010 for a 
contemporary summary).  
 
Before deciding how these new connectionists stand up to the systematicity challenge, we must 
ask: what is the core of F&P’s argument?  We propose that their argument is centred around 
the supervenience relation.  In other words, we can do science at L1, e.g., neuroscience, 
or at L2, e.g., representational cognitive psychology, or we can look at how L1 becomes or 
produces or gives rise to L2.  The strong version of the F&P objection is “if you can’t show 
me how L2 supervenes on L1, then your proposed L1 is nonsense.”  But that doesn’t make 
much sense: why should the duty to demonstrate a possibly mysterious supervenience relation 
fall solely on the L1 side?  F&P are presumably happy with the idea that L2 supervenes on 
at least something physical.  Thus it’s better to read them as merely saying that the L1--L2 
supervenience relation is non-obvious and worthy of further research.  We can also take them to 
be defending against the strong opposing claim that L2 is unnecessary or reduces completely to 
L1.
 
We assume that explanatory pluralism is inevitable in the cognitive sciences and beyond; we 
take this to be uncontroversial.  We have argued elsewhere (de Pinedo & Noble, 2008) that in 
explaining the behaviour of evolved agents, both agent- and sub-agent level explanations will 
be necessary.  We are not saying that Fodorian representationalism is specifically the correct 
theory at L2, only that the presence of a suitably compelling L1 is not going to obviate the need 
for some variety of L2 explanation.
 
Does the success of an approach such as the new connectionism depend on it producing a 
bridging explanation between itself, L1, and some L2?  Perhaps not.  Consider an example from artificial life -- a particularly useful methodology for exploring potential bridging explanations 
between two levels of description.  Quinn (2002) took a step back from Shannon and Weaver’s 
(1949) characterisation of communication as requiring a signaller, a receiver and an information 
channel.  He constructed a model in which agents seeking to complete a task which would 
benefit from communication have no pre-existing signalling channel.  In Quinn’s model the 
agents evolved to convey information to one another through sensorimotor interaction, 
demonstrating how an information channel could emerge.  
 
At first sight this seems potentially earth-shaking: a model which demonstrates that 
communication does not require a signaller, a receiver and a channel seems quite damaging 
to Shannon’s framework.  However, the existence of the model does not mean that Shannon’s 
framework is without value.  Having seen that it is possible for signalling and response 
behaviours to emerge from sensorimotor interactions (L1), we may still find Shannon’s picture of 
communication useful when discussing explanations of communication at a higher level (L2).
 
Essentially, Quinn has followed F&P’s prescription for avoiding the explanatory hubris of the 
early connectionists: he has provided a new insight into how L1 becomes L2, but not eliminated 
the need for a discussion of L2 itself.  The lesson from the Quinn example is that the new 
connectionism, just like the old connectionism, should not be expected to explain everything.  
It’s a very reasonable scientific question to ask how we get from L1 (neurons, feedback 
cycles, dynamical systems, etc.) to L2 (concepts, reasoning, propositional logic, or at least 
the appearance of such things in human cognition).  It is also reasonable to conduct research 
wholly located at either level.  Neither side, in an L1 versus L2 debate, can use the absence of a 
bridging explanation as a stick to beat the other with.
 
To the extent that a researcher from the new connectionist paradigm claimed that their L1 
description (e.g., a dynamical system) would obviate the need for L2-talk (e.g., representations), 
we would turn the question back on them and ask how they account for the pragmatic 
usefulness of alternative levels of description such as the folk-psychological, the Fodorian 
view of the mind as a propositional logic machine, and the Rylean view of agents working in a 
domain of reasons.  It seems to us that the primary error of the 1980s connectionists was that 
their understandable enthusiasm for their new paradigm led them to make category errors in 
what they claimed it could explain.  It would be a shame for the new connectionists to go down 
the same path.
 
The question of how something like representations may emerge from a neural substrate is a 
tough problem, but it’s a scientific problem.  To our knowledge, the best guess at the chain of 
developments necessary to go from the simplest cognition to complex human behaviour would 
be Braitenberg’s (1984) “Vehicles”, but that is of course a speculative story.  Our point is that 
we do not have to answer the question here, and that such questions are better suited to the 
laboratory rather than the armchair.  Empirical investigation may see some levels of description 
fall away and new ones emerge: this is progress.  We would echo Quine (1951) in noting that 
our choices of explanatory levels and associated supervenience relations are “where rational, 
pragmatic.” 
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